NGM·Financial Services·$209M·#12 / 447 in Financial Services

LPRO Open Lending Corporation

80EXCELLENT

CATEGORY BREAKDOWN

GROWTH100
QUALITY100
STABILITY67
VALUATION94
GOVERNANCE37

METRIC BREAKDOWN

Revenue Growth (YoY)

Year-over-year revenue growth rate

+288.0%
100

> 50% strong

Gross Margin

Revenue retained after direct costs

76.9%
100

> 50% strong

Cash Runway

Months of cash at current burn rate

664 months
100

> 24 months ideal

Debt / Equity

Total debt relative to shareholder equity

179.2%
0

< 25% strong

Price / Sales

Market cap relative to trailing revenue

2.2x
94

< 3x strong

Rule of 40

Growth rate plus operating margin

283
100

> 40 excellent

Insider Ownership

Percentage of shares held by insiders

0.8%
6

> 20% strong

Share Dilution (12M)

Share count increase over last 12 months

-7.8%
100

< 5% ideal

SCORE HISTORY

RESEARCH NOTE

BUSINESS SUMMARY

Open Lending operates the Lenders Protection program — an automated decisioning-and-default-insurance platform that allows credit unions, regional banks, and finance companies to lend to near-prime and non-prime auto-loan borrowers with credit-default protection on the resulting loans.

The mechanic: a participating lender uses Open Lending's analytics to underwrite a borrower they would otherwise decline; the loan is funded by the lender; if the borrower defaults, Open Lending's insurance arrangement covers a defined portion of the loss.

Revenue is certification-and-program fees plus profit-share-from-insurance arrangements. The economic exposure to credit-loss is shared between Open Lending, partner-insurers, and the originating lender — Open Lending earns transaction-volume fees plus a share of the through-cycle insurance economics.

MARKET OPPORTUNITY

The auto-finance market for non-prime borrowers is structurally large:

  • Credit unions and regional banks historically declined non-prime borrowers due to underwriting-and-loss-protection-capability gaps
  • Used-vehicle financing is the dominant volume; new-vehicle non-prime is smaller but higher-ticket
  • Indirect-lending channel through dealer-network relationships drives volume

Macro context: revenue growth of 288% YoY reflects post-trough recovery — Open Lending had a difficult 2022-2023 cycle as auto-loan-loss-rates spiked and the program-economics required restructuring. The current quarter reflects normalization combined with restored partner-lender activity.

REVENUE QUALITY

The economics are distinctive among financial-technology platforms:

  • Gross margin 77% — high; reflects the platform-and-fee economics
  • Operating margin — recovering after the 2022-2023 cycle compression
  • Revenue $93M TTM — modest scale, meaningfully smaller than peak
  • P/S ~2.3 — reflects post-cycle recovery pricing combined with auto-loss-cycle skepticism

What hides in the data: profit-share-from-insurance is timing-distorted. Through-cycle insurance economics depend on the realized loss-rates of loans originated 2-3 years previously; current-period revenue reflects historical-vintage performance.

COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE

The defensible asset is the credit-union-and-bank partner-network plus the underwriting-model performance track record:

  • Multi-year lender relationships with credit unions and banks — switching costs are real once a lender has integrated Open Lending into its decisioning workflow
  • Partner-insurer arrangements for the loss-protection layer — established relationships with reinsurers willing to participate
  • Underwriting-model performance data across multiple credit cycles supports continued insurer participation

What it is not: a moat against scaled bank-direct or fintech-direct lenders that handle non-prime in-house. Open Lending's wedge is the credit-union-and-regional-bank channel that wouldn't otherwise serve this segment.

GROWTH THESIS

Three things have to work:

  1. Auto-loan-credit-cycle normalization — through-cycle loss-rates need to remain at sustainable levels to support continued profit-share economics
  2. Lender-partner-network volume recovery — multiple partner credit-unions paused or reduced volume during the 2022-2023 cycle; restoration is the near-term recovery driver
  3. Insurance-partner relationships hold — the loss-protection arrangement is structurally important; renegotiation or partner-exit would compress the model

KEY RISKS

Three specific risks:

  1. Auto-credit-cycle reversal. A sustained increase in auto-loan loss rates compresses both transaction-volume (lenders pull back) and insurance-economics (loss-share absorbs profit-share).

  2. Partner-insurer exit or renegotiation. The reinsurance arrangement is structurally critical; a meaningful partner-insurer-exit would force model restructuring under pressure.

  3. Macro auto-affordability deterioration. Used-vehicle pricing, interest-rate environment, and consumer-affordability dynamics all affect non-prime auto-loan demand. A meaningful demand contraction compresses volume directly.

VERDICT

The 80.0/100 score captures the post-cycle recovery and the platform-economics quality. The valuation reflects the auto-loan-cycle skepticism plus the operational-recovery uncertainty.

For investors who want auto-finance-tech exposure outside of the direct-consumer-lender platforms and with credit-union-channel positioning, LPRO is the principal liquid public-market vehicle. For investors who can't underwrite auto-loan-cycle exposure or who want diversified-fintech exposure, the cycle-concentration is the legitimate concern.

The single metric to watch next is certified-loan volume per quarter plus profit-share-from-insurance trajectory. Continued volume recovery + stable insurance-economics signals the post-cycle recovery is durable.

Report last updated: May 5, 2026

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DATA INFO

Last updated: May 4, 2026

Sources: SEC EDGAR, Financial Modeling Prep, Yahoo Finance. Not financial advice.