LPRO Open Lending Corporation
CATEGORY BREAKDOWN
METRIC BREAKDOWN
Revenue Growth (YoY)
Year-over-year revenue growth rate
> 50% strong
Gross Margin
Revenue retained after direct costs
> 50% strong
Cash Runway
Months of cash at current burn rate
> 24 months ideal
Debt / Equity
Total debt relative to shareholder equity
< 25% strong
Price / Sales
Market cap relative to trailing revenue
< 3x strong
Rule of 40
Growth rate plus operating margin
> 40 excellent
Insider Ownership
Percentage of shares held by insiders
> 20% strong
Share Dilution (12M)
Share count increase over last 12 months
< 5% ideal
SCORE HISTORY
RESEARCH NOTE
BUSINESS SUMMARY
Open Lending operates the Lenders Protection program — an automated decisioning-and-default-insurance platform that allows credit unions, regional banks, and finance companies to lend to near-prime and non-prime auto-loan borrowers with credit-default protection on the resulting loans.
The mechanic: a participating lender uses Open Lending's analytics to underwrite a borrower they would otherwise decline; the loan is funded by the lender; if the borrower defaults, Open Lending's insurance arrangement covers a defined portion of the loss.
Revenue is certification-and-program fees plus profit-share-from-insurance arrangements. The economic exposure to credit-loss is shared between Open Lending, partner-insurers, and the originating lender — Open Lending earns transaction-volume fees plus a share of the through-cycle insurance economics.
MARKET OPPORTUNITY
The auto-finance market for non-prime borrowers is structurally large:
- Credit unions and regional banks historically declined non-prime borrowers due to underwriting-and-loss-protection-capability gaps
- Used-vehicle financing is the dominant volume; new-vehicle non-prime is smaller but higher-ticket
- Indirect-lending channel through dealer-network relationships drives volume
Macro context: revenue growth of 288% YoY reflects post-trough recovery — Open Lending had a difficult 2022-2023 cycle as auto-loan-loss-rates spiked and the program-economics required restructuring. The current quarter reflects normalization combined with restored partner-lender activity.
REVENUE QUALITY
The economics are distinctive among financial-technology platforms:
- Gross margin 77% — high; reflects the platform-and-fee economics
- Operating margin — recovering after the 2022-2023 cycle compression
- Revenue $93M TTM — modest scale, meaningfully smaller than peak
- P/S ~2.3 — reflects post-cycle recovery pricing combined with auto-loss-cycle skepticism
What hides in the data: profit-share-from-insurance is timing-distorted. Through-cycle insurance economics depend on the realized loss-rates of loans originated 2-3 years previously; current-period revenue reflects historical-vintage performance.
COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE
The defensible asset is the credit-union-and-bank partner-network plus the underwriting-model performance track record:
- Multi-year lender relationships with credit unions and banks — switching costs are real once a lender has integrated Open Lending into its decisioning workflow
- Partner-insurer arrangements for the loss-protection layer — established relationships with reinsurers willing to participate
- Underwriting-model performance data across multiple credit cycles supports continued insurer participation
What it is not: a moat against scaled bank-direct or fintech-direct lenders that handle non-prime in-house. Open Lending's wedge is the credit-union-and-regional-bank channel that wouldn't otherwise serve this segment.
GROWTH THESIS
Three things have to work:
- Auto-loan-credit-cycle normalization — through-cycle loss-rates need to remain at sustainable levels to support continued profit-share economics
- Lender-partner-network volume recovery — multiple partner credit-unions paused or reduced volume during the 2022-2023 cycle; restoration is the near-term recovery driver
- Insurance-partner relationships hold — the loss-protection arrangement is structurally important; renegotiation or partner-exit would compress the model
KEY RISKS
Three specific risks:
-
Auto-credit-cycle reversal. A sustained increase in auto-loan loss rates compresses both transaction-volume (lenders pull back) and insurance-economics (loss-share absorbs profit-share).
-
Partner-insurer exit or renegotiation. The reinsurance arrangement is structurally critical; a meaningful partner-insurer-exit would force model restructuring under pressure.
-
Macro auto-affordability deterioration. Used-vehicle pricing, interest-rate environment, and consumer-affordability dynamics all affect non-prime auto-loan demand. A meaningful demand contraction compresses volume directly.
VERDICT
The 80.0/100 score captures the post-cycle recovery and the platform-economics quality. The valuation reflects the auto-loan-cycle skepticism plus the operational-recovery uncertainty.
For investors who want auto-finance-tech exposure outside of the direct-consumer-lender platforms and with credit-union-channel positioning, LPRO is the principal liquid public-market vehicle. For investors who can't underwrite auto-loan-cycle exposure or who want diversified-fintech exposure, the cycle-concentration is the legitimate concern.
The single metric to watch next is certified-loan volume per quarter plus profit-share-from-insurance trajectory. Continued volume recovery + stable insurance-economics signals the post-cycle recovery is durable.
Report last updated: May 5, 2026
RELATED STOCKS
COMPARE LPRO WITH…
OR QUICK-COMPARE SECTOR PEERS
SCORE ALERT
Get notified when LPRO's score changes by 5+ points.
DATA INFO
Last updated: May 4, 2026
Sources: SEC EDGAR, Financial Modeling Prep, Yahoo Finance. Not financial advice.